Training, hypnosis, and drugs: artificial synaesthesia, or artificial paradises? by Ophelia Deroy & Charles Spence
HYPOTHESIS AND THEORY ARTICLE
published: 14 October 2013
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00660
Training, hypnosis, and drugs: artificial synaesthesia, or
artificial paradises?
Ophelia Deroy1* and Charles Spence2
1 Centre for the Study of the Senses, School of Advanced Study, University of London, London, UK
2 Department of Experimental Psychology, Crossmodal Research Laboratory, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
Edited by:
Roi C. Kadosh, University of Oxford,
UK
Reviewed by:
Beat Meier, University of Bern,
Switzerland
David Luke, University of
Greenwich, UK
*Correspondence:
Ophelia Deroy, Centre for the Study
of the Senses, School of Advanced
Study, University of London, Senate
House, R 276, Malet Street, WC1E
7HU London, UK
e-mail: ophelia.deroy@sas.ac.uk
The last few years have seen the publication of a number of studies by researchers
claiming to have induced “synaesthesia,” “pseudo-synaesthesia,” or “synaesthesia-like”
phenomena in non-synaesthetic participants. Although the intention of these studies
has been to try and shed light on the way in which synaesthesia might have been
acquired in developmental synaesthestes, we argue that they may only have documented
a phenomenon that has elsewhere been accounted for in terms of the acquisition of
sensory associations and is not evidently linked to synaesthesia. As synaesthesia remains
largely defined in terms of the involuntary elicitation of conscious concurrents, we suggest
that the theoretical rapprochement with synaesthesia (in any of its guises) is unnecessary,
and potentially distracting. It might therefore, be less confusing if researchers were to
avoid referring to synaesthesia when characterizing cases that lack robust evidence of a
conscious manifestation. Even in the case of those other conditions for which conscious
experiences are better evidenced, when training has been occurred during hypnotic
suggestion, or when it has been combined with drugs, we argue that not every conscious
manifestation should necessarily be counted as synaesthetic. Finally, we stress that cases
of associative learning are unlikely to shed light on two highly specific characteristic of the
majority of cases of developmental synaesthesia in terms of learning patterns: First, their
resistance to change through exposure once the synaesthetic repertoire has been fixed;
Second, the transfer of conditioned responses between concurrents and inducers after
training. We conclude by questioning whether, in adulthood, it is ever possible to acquire
the kind of synaesthesia that is typically documented in the developmental form of the
condition. The available evidence instead seems to point to there being a critical period for
the development of synaesthesia, probably only in those with a genetic predisposition to
develop the condition.
Keywords: induced synaesthesia, synaesthesia, crossmodal correspondences, pseudo-synaesthesia, learning,
genetic basis, drugs, hypnosis
INTRODUCTION
In Prometheus, Poem of Fire (1910), Scriabin attempted to com-
municate to the audience the synaesthetic experience of colored
musical keys that he claimed to have enjoyed for most of his
life. A color organ was used to project colored lights during the
concert (Peacock, 1985; see also Gawboy and Townsend, 2012,
for a recent performance given at Yale). Critics left the first per-
formance of Scriabin’s work stressing that the lights had “no
possible connection to the music,” and merely “served to divert
the senses of the audience from a too concentrated attention on
the music” (Clarence Lucas quoted in Hull, 1927, p. 227). Several
other artists have used their synaesthetic experiences as material
for their work, but always leaving the public short of having a
first-person experience of the kind of involuntary “sensory blend-
ing” that only they seem to have enjoyed (Harrison, 2001). But
could training succeed where art has so far failed?
Synaesthesia is mostly known as a relatively rare developmen-
tal condition, present in approximately 5% of the adult popu-
lation. The condition appears to have a genetic basis and runs
in families (e.g., Asher et al., 2009; Brang and Ramachandran,
2011). For synaesthetes, the presentation of a stimulus in a certain
modality, or rather its recognition, elicits an additional atypi-
cal sensory concurrent in another unstimulated sensory channel
(Cytowic, 1989/2002; Baron-Cohen and Harrison, 1997; Day,
2005; Cytowic and Eagleman, 2009). Synaesthetes have been
shown to exhibit significantly different performance, as a group,
in a series of behavioral tests, such as the speeded congruency
test presented by Eagleman et al. (2007), designed to capture
the involuntary and robust elicitation of conscious concur-
rents by specific inducers. The repertoire of inducer-concurrent
pairings—for instance, the precise shade of color elicited by
differentmusical notes—is usually not determined before an indi-
vidual reaches the age of 9 years of age, after which time it appears
to remain surprisingly consistent over the rest of the individ-
ual’s lifetime (e.g., Simner et al., 2009; Niccolai et al., 2012a).
Some individuals claim to have lost their synaesthesia after their
teenage years, but, of all the adult synaesthetes who have been
tested in contemporary research, most remember having it since
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childhood. Recently though, researchers have started to talk more
frequently about the possibility of “acquiring” synaesthesia later
in life (Ward, 2007), following short-term training, but also as
a result of hypnosis, drug-use, or the extended use of certain
sensory-substitution devices that systematically convert visual
images into patterns of sound designed for the blind (see also
Auvray and Farina, in press for discussion). As the innate char-
acter of synaesthesia is itself controversial (see Deroy and Spence,
2013a), the label “acquired synaesthesia” is potentially mislead-
ing: After all, all synaesthesia might be acquired. This is why here
we consider that the real question is that of artificially induced
synaesthesia—a label whichmaintains the contrast with the spon-
taneous forms of synaesthesia that have been documented to
develop in children, and encompass cases of training, including
following the use of certain conversion devices, as well as drugs or
hypnosis. Possible artificially induced synaesthesia, in turn, can
be distinguished from what might be better called late emerging
synaesthesia that is supposed to occur spontaneously after cer-
tain kinds of brain damage or sensory deprivation (e.g., Lessel
and Cohen, 1979; Jacobs et al., 1981; Bender et al., 1982; Vike
et al., 1984; Rizzo and Eslinger, 1989; Harrison and Baron-Cohen,
1996; Armel and Ramachandran, 1999; Ro et al., 2007; see also
Ward, 2007; Afra et al., 2009). The current article will focus on
the possibility of an artificial induction of synaesthesia through
associative learning. As associative learning has sometimes been
complemented by drugs, or substituted for sessions of hypnotic
suggestion, we will also consider the role of hypnosis and drugs,
but only as far as they relate to training (see Auvray and Farina,
in press; Terhune et al., in press, for broader considerations on
these points). We are faced here with an alternative: have training,
hypnosis and drugs been capable of artificially inducing synaes-
thesia or is it a mere ungrounded hope—an artificial paradise,
as mentioned in the title, in reference to the famous essay where
Baudelaire describes the extraordinary blending of sensory expe-
riences he and his friends had when under the influence of drugs?
(see also Gautier, 1843/1962).
Testing for the possibility of inducing synaesthesia in non-
synaesthetes through training is not an end in-and-of-itself.
The majority of the studies that have reached for the “acquired
synaesthesia” label, either as an artificially induced form of the
condition, or as a result of its emergence later in life have seem-
ingly intended to shed some light on the processes by which
a few adults end-up as synaesthetes. Given the questions that
still surround the neurological (e.g., whether it comes from
“extra wires or altered function,” Bargary and Mitchell, 2008,
p. 335) and developmental origins of synaesthesia (whether
it is innate or due to over-learned associations, see Baron-
Cohen, 1996; Maurer and Mondloch, 2005; Cohen Kadosh
et al., 2009; Holcombe et al., 2009; Deroy and Spence, 2013a),
and given the higher and higher prevalence granted to the
phenomenon (up to 1 on 10 once spatial and non-sensory
cases are included, see Sagiv and Ward, 2006; see also Simner
et al., 2006), this is a legitimate and important scientific query.
However, we want to question whether the evidence collected
in any of the artificially induced cases actually sheds light on
the fundamental issues raised by the occurrence of synaesthesia
in adults.
In the next section, we critically evaluate the problem with
the series of recent studies (see Table 1 for an overview) which,
despite the negative results obtained, remain ambivalent regard-
ing the relation between these results and synaesthesia, and con-
tinue to believe that more, or better, training could perhaps one
day bridge the gap between synaesthetes and non-synaesthetes.
Most of them have, either explicitly or implicitly, suggested that
behavioral results were sufficient to subsume artificially induced
cases within the category of synaesthesia—be it as “synaesthe-
sia” (Gebuis et al., 2009a), “pseudo-synaesthesia” (Howells, 1944;
Verhagen and Engelen, 2006; Colizoli et al., 2013a), or “implicit
synaesthesia” (e.g., Knoch et al., 2005). We would like to ques-
tion the relevance of attaching the label “synaesthesia,” in any
of its guises, to the results that have been obtained to date here.
On the contrary, we argue that, if anything, it is the failure to
induce a conscious synaesthetic concurrent which makes these
studies interesting, as these examples help to build a contrast
with synaesthesia. Indeed, what this failure suggests is that con-
scious concurrents come from a very rare predisposition and
will not be found in the general population, and/or that there
is a critical period (e.g., Daw, 2003) during which associative
learning can result in the involuntary elicitation of conscious
synaesthetic concurrents. We then move to a critical evaluation
of a number of other ways in which, over the years, researchers
have claimed that synaesthesia can be trained, namely, as a result
of hypnotic suggestion or by introducing drugs during train-
ing. Here, although the occurrence of conscious concurrents is
better evidenced, it is important to remember not to assimi-
late any apparently arbitrarily-induced conscious experiences to
synaesthesia—if the latter is supposed to be distinct from invol-
untary crossmodal mental imagery and/or hallucinations (Spence
and Deroy, 2013a).
In conclusion, we stress that the inflation of new kinds
of “synaesthetic” phenomena witnessed in the last decade
is most probably not the right way in which to establish
the scientific importance of the condition. On the contrary,
we believe that this ambivalent extension potentially distracts
researchers from singling out what is supposedly special about
the developmental condition initially and centrally targeted by
the term.
EIGHT DECADES OF FAILURE
RECENT FINDINGS
Several recent behavioral studies have attempted to induce
synaesthesia (or, as we shall see later, “synaesthesia-like behav-
ior”) in non-synaesthetic participants as a result of training. It
is worth describing these studies in some detail here.
In the first of the recent spate of acquisition studies, Meier
and Rothen (2009) repeatedly exposed 20 non-synaesthetic par-
ticipants to four letters (A, B, C, and D) each presented in one
of four distinctive colors (red, green, yellow, and blue, respec-
tively). The participants were presented with a total of 480 letters
during training: In half of these presentations, the letters were pre-
sented in the “associated” color, while, in the remainder of the
trials, they appeared in one of the three other colors. The partici-
pants had to make a speeded YES/NO discrimination response to
indicate whether the color of each letter was appropriate or not.
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Table 1 | Summary of studies that have tried to induce an association between sensory features or dimensions comparable to synaesthesia.
Study N Association (IM:
intramodal; CM:
crossmodal)
Number of trial (over
what time period)
Behavioral/neural effect Conscious concurrent
Kelly, 1934 18 Tone-color (CM) 320–3000 (7 weeks) No effect No
Howells, 1944 8 Tone-color (CM) 25,000 (12 h for first
5000)
Stroop-type In the odd participant
Nunn et al., 2002 12 Auditory words-colors (CM) (<1 day) No change in V4/V8 neural
activity
No
Elias et al., 2003 1 Digit-color (IM) (8 years) Synaesthetic Stroop effect No
Ernst, 2007 12 Visual luminance-haptic
stiffness (CM)
500 (1 h) Enhanced multisensory
integration
Not assessed
Cohen Kadosh et al., 2009 4 Digit-color (IM) Brief hypnotic
suggestion
Impaired digit detection task
performance
Yes
Meier and Rothen, 2009 20 Grapheme-color (IM) 10min/day—3300 trials
(7 days)
Synaesthetic Stroop effect No
Rothen et al., 2011 20 Grapheme-color (IM) Non adaptive, 480 trials
for 10 days
Priming task (stronger after
adaptive training)
No
20 Grapheme-color (IM) Adpative, 248 trials for
10 days
Kusnir and Thut, 2012 28 Grapheme-color (IM) 1620 trials Synaesthetic Stroop effect No
Colizoli et al., 2013a 15 Grapheme-color (IM) 45min (× 2–3 days)
read, 49,000 word book
(2–4 weeks)
Synaesthetic Stroop effect Weak support
Rothen et al., 2013 1 Swimming style
(pictures)-color (IM)




N = Number of participants taking part in study.
This training took place for 10min a day over 7 consecutive days.
On the eighth day, Meier and Rothen were able to demonstrate
what they called a “synaesthetic Stroop effect”—that is, a sig-
nificant difference in the reaction time (RT) and accuracy of
participants’ responses when trying to identify the color of a letter
presented in a manner that was either congruent or incongru-
ent with the intramodal associations that they had been exposed
to over the course of the preceding week. Interestingly, no evi-
dence of a conditioned synaesthetic response was demonstrated.
This was measured in a synaesthetic conditioning test in which a
grapheme that had been reliably associated with a particular color
during training was tested to see whether or not it would, by itself,
elicit a significant galvanic skin response (GSR) following a period
of conditioning in which a color patch (of that particular color)
had repeatedly been associated with the presentation of a loud
and startling sound. By contrast, a group of thirteen grapheme-
color synaesthetes exposed to a very similar training regimen in
an earlier study did indeed exhibit a robust conditioning response
(Meier and Rothen, 2007).
In a second study, Kusnir and Thut (2012) attempted to
teach their participants a number of specific letter-color associ-
ations under somewhat less contrived experimental conditions:
Specifically, the participants were not instructed about the goal of
the study; What is more, the training phase of Kusnir and Thut’s
experiment consisted of participants performing a visual search
task in which they had to make speeded left/right spatial dis-
crimination responses to indicate the side of the screen on which
a particular target letter had been presented. There were seven
possible letters in total and three were presented symmetrically
on either side of the screen on each trial. Unbeknownst to the
participants, however, certain of the letters appeared somewhat
more frequently in a given color than in any of the others 1.
Evidence that the participants had learned (or internalized) the
letter-color associations that they had been exposed to during the
training phase of the experiment was provided by the demonstra-
tion that color-letter congruency once again affected participants’
performance in a “synaesthetic Stroop task” similar to that used
by Meier and Rothen (2009). Interestingly, Kusnir and Thut
(2012) went on to report interference between the learned (asso-
ciated) color and the real color in which the letter was actually
presented that depended upon their relative positions in color
space (i.e., whether they constituted opponent vs. non-opponent
colors). According to the authors, this particular aspect of their
results suggested that the automatic formation of grapheme-color
associations had taken place on a perceptual rather than merely
on a conceptual level (Kusnir and Thut, 2012). However, it should
be remembered here that opponent colors might also be more
easily conceptualized as distinct, and thus, help to build two poles
to which to refer the curved vs. angular letters that were the
1In fact, the pairings between the letters “H” and “U” and the colours blue and
red were not systematic but rather just statistically more frequent, and inserted
among other colour-letter pairings that were varied randomly (i.e., the letters
were uncorrelated with the colour in which they happened to be presented) on
a trial-by-trial basis. Note also that the pairings varied from one participant to
the next (H-blue or red, U-blue or red).
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target of the study (see, for instance, the discussion in Spector and
Maurer, 2011; Simner, 2012; see also Proctor and Cho, 2006).
Finally, the participants in the most recent acquisition study,
this time conducted by Colizoli et al. (2013a), had to read a book
(or, in a few enthusiastic cases, chose to read up to five books)
in which the letters had been colored consistently (A, E, S, T in
either red, orange, green, and blue; high frequency letters paired
with high-frequency colors). On average, the participants read
nearly 500,000 colored characters over a 2–4 week period. The
specific color-letter matches used in this experiment were based
on each participant’s stated preference, as established at the start
of the study. After having read at least one book, the participants
once again exhibited behavioral congruency effects in a “synaes-
thetic” version of the Stroop task. They also failed to exhibit any
synaesthetic release from crowding in another visual task, arguing
against the existence of any low-level visual effects (cf. Cavanagh,
2001; Vatakis and Spence, 2006; Tyler and Likova, 2007).
Colizoli et al. (2013a) argued that they succeeded in induc-
ing genuinely synaesthetic associations based on the replies given
by participants to two of the 19 questions that they were asked
relating to their experience of reading in color. However, it is
important to note that participants’ mean response to one of the
questions [“I am experiencing color when I see certain letters (in
addition to the color of the text)”] that perhaps comes closest to
tapping the existence of a sensory concurrent elicited responses
near the bottom of the response scale (M = 1.5), while their
responses to the other (“I am experiencing color when I think about
certain letters”) fell close to the midpoint of the 5-point Likert
scale (M = 2.5). What’s more, in the absence of answers to the
very same questions prior to training (cf. Finke and Schmidt,
1977; Broerse and Crassini, 1984), or measures of any individual
differences in the vividness of visual imagery (e.g., Marks, 1973;
Craver-Lemley and Reeves, 2013; Lacey and Lawson, 2013), it is
difficult to know how much these responses were actually a result
of the training regimen that the participants had been exposed to,
vs. a baseline tendency in certain of the participants to imagine
vividly.
OLDER STUDIES
Given the long history of research on the topic of synaesthesia
(see Galton, 1880, for what may well be the first popular scientific
study on the condition), it is perhaps inevitable, that older refer-
ences are, on occasion, simply forgotten. However, it is more than
a little unfortunate that not one of the just-mentioned acquisi-
tion studies made anything more than merely a passing reference
(and that only in Meier and Rothen, 2009) to the much older lit-
erature on the acquisition of “(pseudo)synaesthesia” as a result of
conditioning or associative learning where more training (than in
these recent studies) was, on occasion, given. Indeed, a number of
researchers attempted to induce synaesthesia in non-synaesthetes
back in the 1930’s and 40’s: Here, we are thinking particularly
of the work of Kelly (1934) and Howells (1944). These early
researchers attempted to establish (cross-sensory) synaesthesia,
described by Howells (1944, p. 316) as a “tendency of auditory
stimuli to arouse simultaneous sensations or images of color as
well as of sound” in participants using a methodology that is
conceptually similar to that used in the more recent studies.
So, for instance, one group of participants in Kelly’s (1934)
study was repeatedly exposed to a consistent mapping between
each of the 8 notes constituting the C-major diatonic scale with
a different color (C—White; D—Red; E—Orange; F—Yellow;
G—Green; A—Blue; B—Violet; C1—White). The majority of
participants were then exposed to 320 repetitions of these stim-
ulus pairs over a period of 7 weeks. The participants were
subsequently presented with the notes and asked about any spon-
taneous colors that they saw, and which color matched each of
the notes. Kelly (1934) argued that he had not been able to induce
synaesthesia (what he called artificial chromaesthesia) because
of the lack of stable conscious sensory concurrents on the part
of his participants—although some of those taking the mescal
reported having other kinds of conscious experiences. As he put
it: “Without question, the results turned out negative. They are
so distinctly so that the writer has no hesitancy in concluding
that it is impossible to produce chromoaesthesia in normally
non-synaesthetic adult subjects by the technique of conditioned
response” (Kelly, 1934, p. 336).
Now Kelly (1934) cannot be faulted for not trying here: There
can’t be many published studies in the field of experimental psy-
chology that include both the unexpected firing of a pistol (blank)
from close to the participant during the course of the experiment
(in order to see whether putting them into a nervous state, by
giving the participant “bad fright,” would increase the likelihood
of synaesthesia) and the use of peyote(Lophophora williamsii, a
known hallucinogen) to try to induce the condition, albeit tem-
porarily! Nowwhile the firing of the pistol cartridgemay well have
given rise to “a most admirable emotional disturbance” (p. 332),
and the peyote to “gorgeous arrays of colored visions” (p. 335),
not to mention severe nausea, there was absolutely no evidence
of any stable conscious sensory concurrents being elicited by the
presentation of specific sounds. Kelly’s (1934, p. 334) conclusion
on this point was unequivocal: “Not one of the eighteen subjects
acquired any tendency to see colors upon the presentation of the
auditory stimuli.”
A decade later, Howells (1944) pointed to the problems asso-
ciated with the use of introspective report in Kelly’s (1934)
original study (something that Kelly himself happily admitted to).
Howells, for his part, presented his participants with up to 25,000
trials of an arbitrary mapping between color and the pitch of a
sound at around the same time. The participants had to discrim-
inate a stimulus patch as being either one of two complementary
colors (red vs. green) under conditions where the saturation of
the colors could be varied in order to make the participants’ task
either easier or harder. Performance in this task was facilitated by
the presentation of a sound paired with each visual stimulus that
onset just before the color patch and continued during its pre-
sentation (261Hz middle C accompanied red, and higher tone
392Hz, the G above with green stimulus).
To minimize the risk of response bias (i.e., to avoid the possi-
bility of participants simply responding to the tone rather than
to the light) a few trials were introduced into the experimen-
tal design whereby the tone that was presented was incorrect
(thus, putatively inducing errors in participants’ performance in
relation to the strength of the crossmodal association that had
been formed). After all that training, it should come as little
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surprise that participants respondedmore slowly, andmade addi-
tional errors, on those trials in which the sound playing in the
background was incongruent with the crossmodal association
that had been trained. In order to try to tap into any more per-
ceptual (as opposed to response-related) effects, Howells (1944)
subsequently had a couple of his participants adjust a color patch
to a neutral point between red and green, or else adjust it to get
the best possible white. Under such conditions, a noticeable influ-
ence of the tone playing in the background was observed, with the
color being adjusted by the participants as if to make up for any
color attributable to the presentation of the sound.
Here, in contrast to Kelly’s (1934) earlier study, we find subjec-
tive reports suggestive of what Howells (1944, p. 101) tentatively
calls pseudo-synaesthesia: “The same S also volunteered that he
saw a clear image of the screen of the chromatoscope, and of the
color normally associated with a given tone, when this tone was
sounded while the eyes were closed or in the darkened room.”
That said, the author also goes on to question “Whether or not the
development of this experiment are representative of true synaes-
thesia, or merely what one writer has called pseudo-synaesthesia.”
Indeed, what is clear from a careful reading of Howell’s original
study is that there was no evidence of systematic rich sensory con-
currents having been consistently induced across all (or even a
majority) of his participants.
The question that one might want to ask at this point is why
it is that these older studies are seemingly ignored by contempo-
rary researchers interested in inducing synaesthesia, and why it
is that prophecies concerning the acquisition of genuine synaes-
thesia (where the presentation of a given inducer reliably gives
rise to a conscious sensory concurrent) being just round the cor-
ner are still being expressed, when negative results also show
up nowadays? There are certainly grounds for taking colored-
graphemes as a test case for the acquisition of novel (intramodal)
correspondences between sensory and/or conceptual attributes.
Furthermore, it would seem logical to take the association that
is by far the most common in the case of synaesthesia, present
in almost 70% of self-reported cases (see Day, 2005). By con-
trast, trying to train a perceptual association between the pitch
of sounds and different colors (Kelly, 1934; Howells, 1944) might
be expected to be harder to establish, given that researchers
currently believe that its’ occurrence is much rarer amongst devel-
opmental synaesthetes. However, note that this line of reasoning
assumes that there should be a relation between the prevalence of
synaesthesia in the general population and the ease with which
non-synaesthetic adults trained for a relatively brief time, typ-
ically in a laboratory study, should be able to pick-up (that is,
to internalize) an association between two features/dimensions
of their experience. As far as we are aware, this assumption has
yet to be tested empirically. Indeed, there are certainly grounds
for doubting whether the vividness of the concurrent necessarily
has anything to do with the strength of the inducer-concurrent
mapping (see Rader and Tellegen, 1987).
Going one step further, though, it can certainly be questioned
as to whether the phenomenon of synaesthesia actually has any-
thing at all to do with the results of these recent (and older)
acquisition studies. It can be argued that all that has actually
been demonstrated by these various training protocols is the
learning of a novel association (either explicitly or implicitly)
between a relatively small number of pairs of co-occurring sen-
sory/conceptual features.
WHY CHOOSE THE SYNAESTHETIC LABEL?
It is important to note that none of the acquisition studies just
mentioned provided any strong evidence for the occurrence of
a conscious sensory concurrent. Most of these studies hesitate
to claim that they have induced “full-blown” synaesthesia in
any of their non-synaesthetic participants. However, our con-
cern here is that these authors’ extensive use of terms such
as “pseudo-synaesthesia,” “implicit synaesthesia,” “synaesthesia-
like” or synaesthetic interference is likely to confuse rather than
to clarify future debate in this area. The question that we wish to
pose here is what added value accrues by relating these behavioral
results to synaesthesia, never mind by the addition of a range of
other qualifiers?
Researchers who adopt this convoluted terminology implic-
itly or explicitly appeal to two arguments: First, they consider
that similar behavioral aspects are sufficient to characterize a phe-
nomenon as synaesthetic, non-withstanding the occurrence of a
conscious concurrent. Second, they consider that the results of
their studies do not preclude the hope that conscious synaesthe-
sia can be induced in non-synaesthetes. However, both arguments
face severe objections.
WHY BEHAVIOR IS NOT SUFFICIENT
One other way in which to defend the appeal to synaesthesia,
would simply be to drop the necessity of there having to be a
conscious concurrent. Recent debates over the most appropri-
ate definition of synaesthesia and the key criteria to apply to an
increasing variety of kinds and cases have led many researchers in
the field to become very permissive with the use of the term (see
Marks, 2011; Eagleman, 2012; Simner, 2012, for similar worries).
However, of all the controversies surrounding the very existence,
or definition, of synaesthesia that have been documented over
the last 130 years or so (see Galton, 1880, for one of the first
scientific reports on the phenomenon; see also Jewanski et al.,
2009), none have questioned that the fundamental characteris-
tic of synaesthesia is the elicitation of a conscious concurrent.
It is the supplementary conscious aspect which has led to the
coining of the term, which justifies the use of “aesthesia” (which
means perceiving, experiencing). Synaesthetes are those who expe-
rience additional conscious sensory or emotional concurrents, by
comparison with the experience of other individuals, in response
to the actual presentation (or, on occasion, the mere imagina-
tion) of particular sensory, or conceptual, inducers. For instance,
Grossenbacher and Lovelace (2001, p. 36) define synaesthesia as
an “involuntary concrete sensory experience”; Simner (2012, p.
2) stresses that “These sensations are explicitly experienced in
that synaesthetes are consciously aware of them in daily life”;
Ward (2007, p. 429) explains that “Synaesthesia is the auto-
matic elicitation of conscious perceptual experiences by stimuli
not normally associated with such experiences”; and these are
only a few of the many researchers who have stressed the cen-
tral importance of the conscious concurrent to the definition of
synaesthesia.
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When non-conscious cases, such as crossmodal matchings
or associations between apparently unrelated sensory features
or dimensions of experience have been discussed in relation to
synaesthesia, they have typically been recognized within their
own category. Martino and Marks (2001), for example, classified
them as a kind of “weak synaesthesia”—whose relation to con-
scious (or full-blown) synaesthesia remained an open question
(see also Marks, 2011; Spence, 2011; Deroy and Spence, 2013b).
It is important to emphasize here, anyway, that when researchers
talk about “inducing” synaesthesia they certainly do not mean
merely inducing weak synaesthesia.
The possibility of non-conscious cases of synaesthesia has also
beenmentioned in connection with several recent published cases
of implicit bidirectional synaesthesia (see Knoch et al., 2005;
Cohen Kadosh and Henik, 2006; Cohen Kadosh et al., 2007;
Johnson et al., 2007; Gebuis et al., 2009a,b; Weiss et al., 2009).
These studies have demonstrated that certain of the synaesthetes
who consciously experience colors when seeing numbers or let-
ters can also show specific patterns of behavioral priming for—or
interference with—the processing of a letter or number when a
colored stimulus is presented that happens to match the synaes-
thetic concurrent usually experienced in response to that number
or letter. Elsewhere, Rothen et al. (2010) have reported that tran-
scranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) over parieto-occipital brain
areas can eliminate the behavioral effects of implicit bidirectional
synaesthesia, as it does for the conscious cases in the reverse direc-
tion (see Muggleton et al., 2007). There is therefore, good empir-
ical evidence that certain of the neural substrates responsible for
the conscious elicitation of a concurrent also underlie the uncon-
scious effects that have now been documented in the opposite
direction. That said, while these studies may well have successfully
established a non-conscious correlate of conscious synaesthesia,
they have certainly not demonstrated the existence of a fully non-
conscious form of synaesthesia. Note also that in the very rare,
and possibly unique, case of explicit bidirectional synaesthesia
studied by Cohen Kadosh et al. (2007), distinct patterns of neural
activation, together with different timecourses were observed for
the neural activations associated with grapheme-color and color-
grapheme variants—this despite the fact that similar congruency
effects were reported in both directions at the behavioral level (cf.
Gebuis et al., 2009a).
The occurrence of a conscious concurrent therefore, plays
a key role in the diagnosis of synaesthesia, be it established
by means of questionnaire data (see http://www.synaesthesia.
uwaterloo.ca/ColorAssessment.htm), or through the now seem-
ingly well-accepted battery of tests developed by Eagleman et al.
(2007). In these tests, participants have, among other things, to
report on their conscious experiences. The test of consistency,
for instance, often remains the standard to identify someone
as a synaesthete. Although the minimal duration of consistency
required to be a synaesthete can be questioned (Simner, 2012),
consistency over short or long periods of time (years or series
of trials, 180, for instance, in Eagleman et al., 2007) is, in the
first place, a way to check the occurrence of a conscious concur-
rent. It is usually combined with other behavioral tests, the latter
designed to confirm that a positive result on the former cannot
simply be explained in terms of learned associations (e.g., Calkins,
1893; Eagleman et al., 2007), such as have been evidenced to
affect participants’ performance in a variety of Stroop-like inter-
ference, priming, and speeded congruency tasks (see Elias et al.,
2003; Hancock, 2006; Eagleman et al., 2007). The majority of
training experiments did not evidence the long-term consistency
of the effects, therefore, failing to pass this test. This said, it is
important to remember that even passing this test (for instance,
with the 6 month positive re-test conducted by Colizoli et al.,
2013a) does not demonstrate that a conscious concurrent expe-
rience necessarily occurs: Positive results might, in principle, be
obtained, because of an individual’s memories or non-conscious
associations.
A more robust test, according to Rothen et al. (2013), comes
from the transfer of a conditioning response formed with the
concurrent (e.g., the association between a color and a startling
sound) to the inducer (e.g., the presentation of a letter). This test
establishes a strong distinction between synaesthesia and trained
associations, and helps to establish the genuineness of synaes-
thetic reports, for instance in rare forms such as swimming style
synaesthesia. As shown by this physiological test, and argued else-
where (see Deroy and Spence, 2013b; see also Marks, 2011, for
discussion), the systematic presence of a conscious concurrent
in synaesthetes connects to other relevant differences in terms of
how the association evolves over time.
WHY SYNAESTHESIA IS NOT THE ONLY AVAILABLE LABEL
Couldn’t the behavioral effects and implicit components present
in the acquisition (or teaching) cases be better conceptual-
ized, then, in terms of the notion of cross-correspondences?
Crossmodal correspondences have been defined in terms of
matchings between features, or dimensions of experience across
distinct senses, due to weak correlations in the environment (e.g.,
Spence, 2011). In contrast to what is the case in synaesthesia,
crossmodal correspondences typically do not give rise to a con-
scious sensory concurrent (except, perhaps, in the case of those
individuals with especially vivid crossmodal mental imagery; see
Spence and Deroy, 2013a). Crossmodal correspondences tend to
be shared amongst those individuals exposed to a particular set of
environmental conditions, and those, like certain audiovisual cor-
respondences, that are linked to robust physical or phonological
regularities appear to be universal (e.g., Bremner et al., 2013).
The fact that crossmodal correspondences do not seem to
immediately correlate with an obvious environmental regularity
has been taken to show that they reflect innate or given predispo-
sitions (Gibson, 1969; Marks, 1978; Maurer andMondloch, 2005;
see Deroy and Spence, 2013a, for discussion). However, a better
understanding of the statistics of the environment and extended
models of associative learning are proving capable of explaining
a large number of the cases of crossmodal correspondences that
have been documented to date (e.g., see Deroy et al., in press;
Parise and Spence, in press). If that is the case, why not sim-
ply say that the sort of associations learned (or strengthened) in
the studies of Meier and Rothen (2009); Kusnir and Thut (2012),
and Colizoli et al. (2013a) demonstrate that adults can acquire
intramodal (or crossmodal, if shape and color are considered as
independent channels) correspondences, instead of training them
in terms of the induction of synaesthesia-like phenomena? The
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availability of this alternative explanation questions the fact that
synaesthesia is the only existing category to enlist and study the
kind of phenomena documented above.
WHY LEARNING ASSOCIATIONS DIFFERS FROM DEVELOPING
SYNAESTHESIA
Even when they acknowledge the difference between the out-
comes of training and synaesthesia, the authors of the recent
training studies remain ambivalent in their conclusions: While
two of the groups of researchers explicitly conclude that their
results do not demonstrate that synaesthesia can be acquired
(Meier and Rothen, 2009; Colizoli et al., 2013a)), all three research
groups remain surprisingly upbeat about the possible acquisition
of synaesthesia in adulthood—stressing that perhaps the amount
of training in their studies may simply have been insufficient to
elicit the full-blown condition in any of their participants. Take,
for example the following quote from Meier and Rothen (2009,
p. 1210): “the synaesthetic Stroop test is very useful to assess
the strength of a semantic association. However, it seems to fail
to assess what is unique about synaesthesia, namely the experi-
ence of the synaesthetic color”; or this from Colizoli et al. (2013a,
p. 6) “these results alone are not enough to conclude the presence
of synesthesia, since over-learned associations produce a Stroop
effect.” However, Meier and Rothen (2009, p. 1211) concluded
their study by stating that: “it will be interesting to test whether
it is possible to induce a synaesthetic experience with more train-
ing.” Later, Rothen et al. (2011) also conclude: “Future research
using more extensive adapting training must reveal the boundaries
of training synaesthetic experiences” (Rothen et al., 2011, p. 1250).
It may be instructive to contrast those recent studies claiming
to have induced synaesthesia (or one of its variants), as a result of
training with the growing number of studies that have started to
investigate the establishment of other kinds of correspondences
(of both the intramodal and crossmodal variety) between erst-
while unassociated objects or dimensions of experience. These
studies remain largely absent from the discussion initiated by the
authors committed to studying the possibility of artificially induc-
ing synaesthesia. They originate in the growing interest in trying
to understand the ways in which the brain continuously updates
its priors in response to changes in the statistics of the environ-
ment (e.g., Wozny and Shams, 2011; Xu et al., 2012; see also Baier
et al., 2006; VanWanrooij et al., 2010; Zangenehpour and Zatorre,
2010). Ernst (2007), for example, has demonstrated that peo-
ple exposed to an arbitrary crossmodal associations between the
luminance of a visual stimulus and its felt stiffness, a haptically-
ascertained stimulus property (manipulated by means of a force
feedback device) that is not (as far as anyone is aware) correlated
with luminance in the natural environment, can give rise to a
change in the strength of the coupling prior.
The participants in Ernst’s (2007) study were trained with
pairs of multisensory (visual-haptic) stimuli where an artificial
correlation had been introduced between the two unisensory
stimulus dimensions: For one group of participants, the brighter
the object, the stiffer it was, while this mapping was reversed for
the remainder of the participants. The results highlighted a signif-
icant change in participants’ discrimination performance when
their responses to congruent and incongruent pairs of haptic
stimuli were compared before and after training. Ernst attributed
these findings to changes in the distribution of the coupling prior.
Given the very different theoretical background to this study (as
compared to the acquisition studies mentioned earlier), it is per-
haps unsurprising that he did not ask his participants whether the
presence of one stimulus gave rise to any kind of concurrent in
the other modality. Hence, at one level, we cannot say for certain
whether or not Ernst’s participants acquired any synaesthesia-like
abilities following training.
Now, clearly, the experimental paradigm utilized by Ernst
(2007) exhibits some important differences from the other
acquisition-by-training studies that were mentioned earlier.
Namely, in contrast to the other acquisition studies, where par-
ticular stimuli were associated (i.e., without there being any
alignment of dimensions of experience, except for Kelly (1934, pp.
323–324) who did try to align his auditory and visual stimuli but
did so using what is known as the Newtonian parallel: “in order
to take advantage of any possible existent relationship between color
and tone (generally known as the Newtonian parallel) it was decided
to pair each note of the octave with the color occupying the same rel-
ative position in the spectral series as the note occupies in the musical
scale.”) Ernst, by contrast, used correlated dimensions of experi-
ence. Hence, his participants presumably learned the appropriate
alignment (at a perceptual level) between two already familiar
dimensions and, in so doing, likely demonstrated a generalization
of learning beyond the particular set of stimuli that participants
had been exposed to during training.
In other words, training studies interested in synaesthesia rely
on associative learning to form a one-to-one matching between
two limited sets of dimensions or objects, or what one might call
a bijection: Each letter should be associated to a different color,
and each color to a different letter. By contrast, studies interested
in new binding priors rely on associative learning to recalibrate
an existing mapping, where each and every value on one dimen-
sion, even beyond the learned ones, will correspond to at least
one value on the other dimension (with the possibility of two dif-
ferent values on one dimension corresponding to a single value
on the other, because of differences in accuracy). This contrast
helps pointing out that training studies for synaesthesia are—at
least—implicitly committed to synaesthetic associations being of
the matching rather than the mapping form.
Now, if one adopts the view that color-grapheme synaesthesia
only comes as a late specification growing out of what can be con-
sidered as amuchmore general mapping from degrees of angular-
ity to degree of brightness (Spector and Maurer, 2008, 2011), this
commitment might need to be revisited.Would it, for instance, be
better to gradually train participants with more and more specific
associations between shapes and colors, up to specific associations
between graphemes and individual shades? None of the studies
which have claimed to have induced some association related to
synaesthesia has been particularly interested in testing this specific
prediction, because they all choose to start with the synaesthetic
inducers known in adults, that is, with graphemes. Notice here
that synaesthetes can report having the same color for differ-
ent letters, suggesting also that the one-to-one correspondence is
not necessarily the right way to think about the determination of
associations.
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Finally, in all of the training cases, we wish to argue that what
these training studies miss is the resistance of synaesthesia to
further exposure: Once graphemes have been associated with a
specific color, synaesthetes cannot simply be retrained to asso-
ciate them to new colors, nor does their synaesthesia seem to be
distorted by novel exposure. This point is particularly important
as it highlights, in our sense, what might be special about the
induction of a conscious concurrent in developmental synaes-
thetes, that is, that the association is constantly reinforced every
time a grapheme is seen, and appears with the concurrent color
(whereas the association will fade in non-synaesthetes, who will
just see the grapheme in its actual color).
WHAT WEWIN FROM RESISTING THE SYNAESTHETIC LABEL
Instead of looking for—or continuing to prophesy about—the
possible occurrence of a conscious concurrent after training a par-
ticular association, the decision to qualify the effects of training as
being “synaesthetic” at all should impinge on empirically testable
hypotheses.
Besides the conceptual issues, the question also has method-
ological implications regarding the choice of stimuli and asso-
ciations to be used in training studies. Noticeably, in order to
decide that idiosyncratic synaesthetic concurrent-inducer rela-
tions can be quickly trained, future studies should presumably
avoid using those stimuli that happen to follow existing intra-
or crossmodal correspondences (which, in this case, would only
be strengthened through training). One reason to raise this
worry comes from Colizoli et al. (2013b) who mentioned the
existence of a “synaesthetic” Stroop effect even before train-
ing. Out of the four color-letter associations tested by Meier
and Rothen (2009), three correspond to the implicit associations
shared by many synaesthetes (see Simner et al., 2005): A’s are
commonly red, C’s yellow, and D’s blue for non-synaesthetes as
well as for synaesthetes. One way in which to see whether the
strength of the training effect reported in Rothen and Meier’s
study might have come from the reinforcing of pre-existing
correspondences in the non-synaesthetic participants would be,
then, first to test participants for their letter-color associations
prior to testing, and at least to compare the results for these
three letters with the non-common association of B and green
(B’s are usually associated with blue). This would not directly
solve the issue of whether a conscious concurrent can be elicited
after training, but would at least help to determine whether
crossmodal correspondences have something to do with the
results.
A more directly testable empirical prediction to draw out here
is that if a synaesthesia-like phenomenon is at stake in the train-
ing studies, rather than an intramodal correspondence, then it
should show a high degree of automaticity. Contrary to what
appears to be the case for synaesthesia, it is indeed questionable
whether or not crossmodal correspondences are automatic, i.e.,
goal-independent and load-insensitive (see Spence and Deroy,
2013b, for a review; see also Mattingley, 2009). Differences
in reaction-time (RT) in Stroop-like tasks or other behavioral
paradigms could be used to compare the kind of “trained” rela-
tions that are labeled as “synaesthetic” and cross- or intra-modal
correspondences, but this should be done with equally trained
participants (some reporting visual concurrents vs. others who
do not) given independent evidence that the amount of training
increases the RT differences between congruent and incongru-
ent conditions in Stroop-like tasks (MacLeod and Dunbar, 1988;
Colizoli et al., 2013b).
As a second test, one might consider whether the behavioral
results from these (or future) acquisition studies shouldn’t be
combined with neurological data: Although both synaesthesia
and crossmodal correspondences have been shown to be dis-
turbed by TMS over the appropriate brain areas, the disturbance
of synaesthesia has been shown to result from the disruption
of neural activity in the right parieto-occipital (PO) junction
(Muggleton et al., 2007). By contrast, the disturbance of the
crossmodal correspondence between pitch and brightness in Bien
et al’s. (2012) study was targeted at the intraparietal sulcus
(IPS) instead. Crossmodal correspondences present relevant dif-
ferences with synaesthesia that are now progressively being doc-
umented. Studies highlighting differences between synaesthetes
and non-synaesthetic participants trained with similar associa-
tions (e.g., Nunn et al., 2002; Elias et al., 2003) again argue in
favor of the non-assimilation of artificially induced cases with
synaesthesia, and thus, encourage more systematic comparison
between naturally-occurring crossmodal and intramodal corre-
spondences, evidenced in non-synaesthetic populations, and the
more ephemeral cases of trained pairings of formerly uncorre-
lated stimuli (or, as we have seen, the strengthening of weakly
associated stimuli). Based on the findings of animal neurophys-
iology (e.g., Furster et al., 2000), one might predict that the
acquisition of novel cross-modal associations between formerly
independent auditory and visual features (e.g., a red light being
paired with a high tone and green light with a low tone) might
recruit/require the involvement of the dorsolateral prefrontal cor-
tex. That said, different areas may be involved in the establishing
vs. retention of correspondences. Once firmly established, cor-
respondences may be “represented” at more posterior locations,
such as in parietal areas (see Bien et al., 2012).
INTERIM SUMMARY
In summary, despite the growing support for there being robust,
most often non-conscious crossmodal correspondences in adults
and implicit effects of the concurrent on responses to the inducer
(especially in the case of intramodal grapheme-color synaesthe-
sia), there is, as yet, no convincing evidence to support the claim
that our definition of the condition (synaesthesia) ought to relax
the necessity of a conscious concurrent. What is more, it is per-
haps also worth reiterating that the recent acquisition studies that
were reviewed earlier all agree that a consistent conscious concur-
rent is a key part of what it is to be synaesthetic. Take, for example,
the following from Meier and Rothen (2009, p. 1210) in support
for this view: “we conclude that the synaesthetic Stroop test is very
useful to assess the strength of a semantic association. However, it
seems to fail to assess what is unique about synaesthesia, namely the
experience of the synaesthetic color.”
Next, we turn our attention to some of the other modes of
training in which researchers have claimed that experiences of
synaesthetic colors, and synaesthetic concurrents more broadly
conceived, can be artificially induced, namely through the use
of hypnotic suggestion and by complementing training with the
administration of a drug.
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HYPNOTIC SUGGESTION AND ADDITIONAL DRUGS: NEW
PROSPECTS FOR ARTIFICIALLY INDUCED SYNAESTHESIA?
HYPNOTICALLY INDUCED CONCURRENTS
An influential recent study investigated whether it is possible to
induce synaesthesia by simply instructing non-synaesthetes under
hypnotic suggestion to associate certain colors with particular
graphemes. Cohen Kadosh et al. (2009) conducted an experi-
ment on a small group (N = 4) of highly hypnotically suggestible
non-synaesthetes (these participants had been screened, and had
to have obtained the maximum score on the Stanford Hypnotic
Susceptibility Scale prior to their taking part in the main part of
the study). These participants were hypnotized by Cohen Kadosh
et al., and while under hypnosis, instructed to associate spe-
cific digits with specific colors (just as done by grapheme-color
synaesthetes—here 1-red; 2-yellow; 3-green; 4-turquoise; 5-blue;
and 6-purple). Then, during post-hypnotic suggestion, various
tests were administered, including a digit detection task in which
a sequence of achromatic digits was presented against one of a
number of colored backgrounds. On half of the trials, a digit
was presented, and the participants had to make a YES/NO dis-
crimination response regarding its presence vs. absence. Using
such a task, the authors calculated a measure of perceptual sen-
sitivity (d’) using signal detection theory: Crucially, a significant
drop in participants’ performance was observed when the let-
ters were presented against a background that matched (that is,
was congruent with) the color that had been associated with the
digit while the participants were under hypnosis than when pre-
sented against an incongruently colored background. By contrast,
no such drop in performance was reported in any of the control
groups tested in this study.
Subjective (i.e., phenomenological) reports were also obtained
from the participants. As Cohen Kadosh et al. (2009 p. 263)
report: “At the phenomenological level, participants’ reports after
the posthypnotic suggestion matched those observed in congeni-
tal synaesthetes . . . The cross-modal experience was consistent and
involuntary, and occurred in their everyday life. For example, one
participant reported seeing the digit-color associations when looking
at cars’ license plates or watching television.” This despite the fact
that the post-hypnotic participants didn’t remember having been
instructed concerning any digit-color associations. It is, however,
unclear from the above quote, or from the rest of the text which
aspect of consistency is being referred to here—is it that when-
ever a concurrent was induced it was consistent in its color and/or
was some concurrent (whether or not it was the same one) always
induced on seeing a given inducer?
We would argue that Cohen Kadosh et al.’s (2009) results
provide what is perhaps the strongest evidence to date that non-
synaesthetes can be induced to exhibit behaviors that resemble
those observed in synaesthetes, given the apparent elicitation of
conscious sensory concurrents. Bear in mind, though, that the
authors themselves stop short of claiming that they had been
able to induce synaesthesia, even in their highly suggestible par-
ticipants. Instead, they merely state that: “Here we show that
posthypnotic suggestion induces abnormal cross-modal experience
similar to that in congenital grapheme-color synaesthesia.” (Cohen
Kadosh et al., 2009, p. 258, see also p. 263). What is more,
an alternative explanation for Cohen Kadosh et al.’s striking
results exists; Namely, it is difficult to rule out the possibility
that their participants were not simply engaging in a particu-
larly vivid form of visual mental imagery rather than necessarily
experiencing synaesthetic concurrents. The instructions that were
given to the participants could equally well be associated with
the hypnotic induction of mental imagery as with the hyp-
notic induction of some sort of projector synaesthesia. So, for
example, take Cohen Kadosh et al.’s (2009, p. 260) instructions
to their participants: “Look at the color; this is the color of the
digit _, and whenever you see, think, or imagine that digit, you
will always perceive it in that color.” Remember here that highly
suggestible individuals also tend to have more vivid visual men-
tal imagery (e.g., Crawford, 1982; Rader and Tellegen, 1987),
and that visual imagery has been shown to affect visual per-
ceptual sensitivity in a number of studies (e.g., Ishai and Sagi,
1995).
Again, something conceptually similar to Cohen Kadosh et al.
(2009) had been reported previously. In particular, Leuba (1940)
paired the rubbing of a participant’s arm while under hypnosis
with the smell of creosote. Later, the participant had an olfac-
tory image of creosote whenever his arm was rubbed, although
he too had no memory of making this crossmodal association.
Interestingly, Leuba describes this as an example of conditioned
mental imagery (see also Cytowic, 1989/2002, pp. 67–68).
What’s more, it is not clear, from Cohen Kadosh et al.’s (2009)
report whether any of the highly hypnotically suggestible partic-
ipants might not also have had similar unusual phenomenology
prior to their hypnotic suggestion (cf. Finke and Schmidt, 1977;
Broerse and Crassini, 1984, for a very different example of where
apparently experiment-induced color percepts, actually turned
out to be present prior to experimental manipulation of interest,
thus, perhaps acting as something of a cautionary note here). Ever
since its appearance in the scientific literature, it has proven par-
ticularly difficult to distinguish between synaesthetes and those
with especially vivid mental imagery (see Galton, 1880; Vernon,
1937; Craver-Lemley and Reeves, 2013; Price, in press; Spence and
Deroy, 2013a). Nevertheless, despite the difficulty of drawing this
distinction, many researchers clearly feel it is important to do so.
Future neuroimaging studies might be able to distinguish
between these two accounts in the case of color concurrents/color
imagery induced by the presentation of a given stimulus, given
that color imagery seems to activate an area of the brain that lies
substantially anterior to the classic V4/V8 region thought to be
involved in color perception and often active in synaesthetes when
experiencing conscious color concurrents (see Howard et al.,
1998; Nunn et al., 2002; Rich et al., 2006; Niccolai et al., 2012b).
DRUG-INDUCED CONCURRENTS
Drugs have recently been used as another example, and possibly a
distinct route, to the induction of synaesthesia, following perhaps
the long tradition in writers and artists to consider drugs, a form
of sensory mixing and creativity (e.g., Dailey et al., 1997; Sitton
and Pierce, 2004). Importantly, the induction of synaesthesia
by drugs (often taken as a fact) has been used to constrain
possible accounts of the neural underpinnings of synaesthesia
(Grossenbacher, 1997; Grossenbacher and Lovelace, 2001). Here,
though, we only want to consider the use of drugs in the light
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of the training studies (see Terhune et al., in press, for a recent
review).
In Kelly’s (1934) early study, peyote was used after train-
ing to see whether the predicted occurrence of hallucinatory
experience while the drug was active would follow the condi-
tioned association (trained in the absence of the drug). But,
of the five participants who volunteered to take 15 g of pey-
ote, none reported experiencing the learned color when the
sounds used for training were played (although Kelly, 1934, p.
335, does say that his participants were “rewarded with gorgeous
arrays of colored visions which compared favorably with the ones
described by previous investigators of the so-called divine plant”).
This failed attempt to combine training and induction of con-
scious concurrents contrasts with a more difficult to assess, but
certainly more up to current ethical standards, survey regarding
whether people might have synaesthetic experience while under
the influence of certain pharmacological agents, and this inde-
pendently of any preliminary short-term training with certain
specific associations (see Luke et al., 2012). These researchers
documented correlations between the frequency of drug con-
sumption, the kinds of drugs consumed, and subjective reports
of abnormal crossmodal experiences in recreational drug users.
On the basis of their survey, Luke et al. argued that: “synaesthesia
is frequently experienced following the consumption of serotoner-
gic agonists such as LSD and psilocybin and that these same drugs
appear to augment synaesthesia in congenital synaesthetes.” (Luke
et al., 2012, p. 74). As serotonin (5-HT) is a neurotransmitter
with mostly inhibitory effects, and yet some documented exci-
tatory effects as well, it is difficult to use this correlation to
decide between competing models of synaesthetic induction—in
particular, between Grossenbacher and Lovelace’s (2001) dis-
inhibited feedback account and Ramachandran and Hubbard’s
(2001; Hubbard et al., 2011) direct cross-activation account. One
important test here would be to investigate the combined effect of
serotonin and training in the induction of conscious concurrents.
This said, if the use of drugs were to open new prospects
for the elicitation of conscious experiences in otherwise non-
synaesthetic participants, that would raise important questions
regarding the kind of conscious concurrents that should be con-
sidered as synaesthetic. Sinke et al. (2012) have recently listed a
number phenomenological differences between the experiences
occurring in developmental synaesthesia and those reported in
what they still consider as a separate type of synaesthesia, induced
by drugs. The main lesson of their review, in our sense, is that the
unreliability of the reports and/or the variability of drug experi-
ences in terms of temporal dynamics and contextual or individual
differences (including the quantity and quality of drugs taken)
might not even authorize a systematic comparison, even within
a single class of drugs. In this respect, we would recommend to
stick to behaviorally measurable elements, or neurological data.
Furthermore, unless a form of consistency, through behavioral
tests such as Eagleman et al. (2007) speeded congruency test, is
established, the connection with synaesthesia remains termino-
logical, and no continuity or relation between drug-induced and
non-drug induced cases can be firmly established. How such tests
could be reliably performed with participants under the influ-
ence of a given pharmacological agent is, however, a source of
both ethical and practical concern. The alternative description
for such results is that taking one of these hallucinogenic drugs
leads to nothing more than vivid hallucinations (see MacDougal,
1898; Aghajanian and Marek, 1999). The evidence here could
come from resting-state fMRI, which shows an increased intrin-
sic functional connectivity in synaesthetes similar to that which is
observed in schizophrenic patients who are subject to hallucina-
tions (Jafri et al., 2008).
THE BENEFITS OF RESISTING THE SYNAESTHETIC LABEL
As the occurrence of conscious concurrents remains definitional
and mysterious in synaesthetes, and as synaesthesia is a naturally
occurring phenomenon that is not known to correlate with drug
usage or hypnotic training, it can be argued that the former stud-
ies do not really shed any light on the core of synaesthesia. Is it
however, possible that the brain mechanisms at stake in the hyp-
notic and drug induction of conscious concurrents are similar
to—or at least serve as some sort of proxy for—the mechanisms
explaining the development of synaesthesia?
As far as this suggestion is concerned, it is unclear whether the
results of the hypnotic and drug studies have actually shed any
light on the fixation of the synaesthetic repertoire, given the lack
of any documented consistency over time for the pairs of induc-
ers and concurrents. In Cohen Kadosh et al.’s (2009) study, the
effect only lasted for 3 weeks. The same is true, notice, of Colizoli
et al.’s (2013a,b) more controversial results, as they reported that
the associations that their participants had “learned” had dis-
appeared within 6 months of training having terminated. This,
once again, obviously contrasts with claims regarding the per-
sistence of synaesthetic pairings in developmental synaesthesia,
which usually lasts a lifetime (e.g., Ward, 2013).
Besides consistency, we should not miss some important dif-
ferences between the kinds of conscious experiences obtained
after hypnosis or drug consumption and the kinds of conscious
concurrents reported in synaesthesia. For instance, a vast major-
ity of synaesthetes report experiencing the concurrents “in their
mind’s eye” and as vividly as perceptual experience—two reports
that they do not use to characterize their mental imagery. In the
case of the induced concurrents experienced after drug consump-
tion, it is unclear whether the participants were in a state where
they could reliably assess the vividness of the experience, inde-
pendently of the heightened emotional state also induced by the
drug. No data is given regarding the peculiar location of the con-
current (external, internal, or “in the mind’s eye”). In the case
of the induced concurrents following hypnosis, assessment of the
vividness of the experience is missing, and the concurrents seem
to be experienced as external—a case of projection which is rare
or even controversial (Hupé et al., 2012) in the case of synaes-
thesia. Another difference between the phenomenology of mental
imagery and the most common features of developmental synaes-
thetic cases, is to see whether the experienced form can be zoomed
in upon (a signature feature of spatial mental imagery; Finke and
Shepard, 1986), whereas synaesthetic concurrents can usually not
be changed volitionally (see Price, 2009, for a similar suggestion).
What this suggests is the need to distinguish between the elic-
itation of certain forms of mental imagery, including crossmodal
imagery and synaesthesia. Crossmodal mental imagery is defined
as mental imagery occurring in one sensory modality as the result
of the presentation of a stimulus in another sensory modality.
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The occurrence of auditory mental imagery when watching silent
speech, or the occurrence of visual imagery when walking in the
dark e.g., Sathian and Zangaladze, 2001; Zhang et al., 2004; for
neuroimaging evidence, see Lacey et al., 2010; Lacey and Sathian,
2013, provide good examples of crossmodal imagery. It often
serves a role of crossmodal completion, by filling-in the missing
features of a stimulus that is physically present (e.g., Pessoa and
DeWeerd, 2003; Gallace and Spence, 2011; see Spence and Deroy,
2013a, for a review) but it can also occur in less specific ways as
shown in the elicitation of visual or proprioceptive imagery in
musical experience.
Here, we want to side with Price (2009) in suggesting that
the effects of developmental synaesthesia should be kept distinct
from the mere effects of mental imagery. Although Galton (1880)
became interested in colored-hearing as a case of mental imagery,
most definitions since have considered synaesthesia to be some-
thing different from highly consistent, highly automatic mental
imagery. Even Barnett and Newell (2008) who document higher
self-rated visual imagery in color-grapheme synaesthetes stress
that synaesthesia should be kept distinct from mental imagery.
The underlying mechanisms of synaesthesia are distinct from the
ones involved in classical mental imagery tasks (see Nunn et al.,
2002; Rich et al., 2006; Hupé et al., 2012) and the resulting con-
current usually considered as perceptual, rather than imagistic
(Auvray and Deroy, in press for a review).
We recommend, first, that results of hypnosis and reports
from past drug experiences—as well as future training studies—
should be analyzed with respect to participants’ mental imagery
scores. Taking number-space as an example, there is growing evi-
dence that some—or all—individuals classified as synaesthetes
might just have a particularly vivid and consistent form of spa-
tial or visual imagery, which can be tested independently (Price,
2009). Participants identified with a possible form of synaesthesia,
should also be tested behaviorally (for instance, using Stroop-
tests) while being instructed to imagine a congruent vs. incon-
gruent color (or concurrent). In so doing, Price, for instance,
has shown that many participants identified as “number-space”
synaesthetes because of their spontaneous subjective reports of
experiencing numbers in space would perform in a way that is
similar to other participants with high visual mental imagery in
congruent and incongruent imagery instructions. Price goes on
to suggest that instead of synaesthesia, odd case reports of seeing
numbers in space could be explained in terms of “the interaction
between (1) a predisposition for exaggerated and sometimes dis-
torted spatial coding of numerical or temporal sequences, and (2) the
strong visual imagery needed to make these representations salient
and explicit” (Price, 2009, p. 1239).
CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion, in this article, we have questioned the utility (not
to mention the validity) of talking about learned associations
between erstwhile independent sensory features (or dimensions
of experience) in terms of “pseudo-synaesthesia,” “synaesthesia-
like,” or “acquired synaesthesia” that has become increasingly
popular over the last few years (e.g., see Meier and Rothen, 2009;
Kusnir and Thut, 2012; Colizoli et al., 2013a). It is our posi-
tion that one can avoid the terminological confusion [not to
mention the implications of adding to the problematic unity
(see Marks, 2011), and etiology of synaesthesia (see Maurer and
Mondloch, 2005; Deroy and Spence, 2013a)]. The effects of train-
ing can be more easily accounted for within the category of
crossmodal and intramodal correspondences, and explained in
terms of coupling priors in Bayesian Decision Theory (e.g., Ernst,
2007).
The expansion of different qualifiers for, or divisions between
kinds of, synaesthetes over the last decade or so has tended
to blur the definition of the condition—while most of these
divisions remain controversial, as shown for “associator” and
“projector” synaesthetes (Dixon et al., 2004; Rouw and Scholte,
2007; Ward et al., 2007; though see also Gebuis et al., 2009a),
“lower” and “higher” synaesthetes (Ramachandran andHubbard,
2001; Hubbard et al., 2005; Gebuis et al., 2009a), “explicit” and
“implicit” synaesthetes (Knoch et al., 2005), and “weak” and
“strong” synaesthetes (Martino and Marks, 2001; but see Deroy
and Spence, 2013b). Ultimately, despite many researchers hav-
ing written over the years as if artificially induced synaesthesia
is a well-established condition, as compared to the much more
common (albeit still rare) developmental (sometimes called con-
genital or idiopathic synaesthesia) variety, it is possible to raise
legitimate grounds for pursuing the argument that there may
actually be no such thing as “becoming a synaesthete” in neu-
rotypical adults (see also the evidence for a genetic basis of synaes-
thesia, Asher et al., 2006, and distinctive neurological profile,
Rouw and Scholte, 2010). In other words, it may be impos-
sible to acquire synaesthesia unless one is predisposed to be a
synaesthete and hence develops it during a critical period of
development.
A claim of impossibility seems difficult to support empiri-
cally. After all, three possibilities exist here: (1) It is impossible
to acquire synaesthesia in adulthood, at least if synaesthesia is
defined with respect to the criteria established on the basis of
studies of developmental synaesthesia (and hence robust support-
ing evidence will simply never be forthcoming); (2) It is possible
to acquire synaesthesia in adulthood, but it is just that robust
empirical evidence has not as yet been established to support
this claim; (3) It is evident that non-synaesthetes can become
synaesthetes, and we simply need to change our definition in
order to take account of the kinds of expressions of the con-
dition that are seen in acquired cases. This third option is the
one which seems to encourage the premature labeling of the
effects of training as synaesthetic. In the absence of robust evi-
dence of a successful artificial induction of synaesthesia, the idea
behind the premature label is that training studies are nonetheless
already teaching us something about synaesthesia—for instance,
that Stroop interference between apparently unrelated features is
not a defining characteristic of synaesthesia. This seems to us a
weak argument given the long literature on training and Stroop
interference written independently of any concern for synaesthe-
sia. On the contrary, these training studies highlight how different
synaesthetic pairings are from learned associations, noticeably
that they resist further learning through exposure (Deroy and
Spence, 2013a) and can lead to associatied conditioned responses
(Meier and Rothen, 2009).
The first claim, that training will never bridge the gap
with synaesthesia, is certainly a controversial one, but the one
that the accumulated evidence seems to favor. What about the
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Table 2 | Illustration of the various kinds of phenomena that have been labeled as synaesthetic in the literature—and how they depart from
the characteristics of developmental/canonical synaesthesia.
Name used in the literature Origin Conscious Consistent over long Idiosyncratic Involuntary Rare
concurrent periods of time
Canonical synaesthesia Developmental Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Acquired synaesthesia Training No No n.a. Yes n.a.
Acquired synaesthesia After brain damage or
sensory deprivation
Yes Varying Yes Yes Yes Yes
Acquired synaesthesia Extensive use of a
sensory substitution
device
Yes Weak evidence No Weak evidence Yes
Acquired synaesthesia Drug Sometimes No Yes Yes Unknown
Weak synaesthesia Debated No Yes No Debated No
Neo-natal synaesthesia Innate Weak evidence Yes No Yes No
This table shows that, even in the broad category of “acquired synaesthesia,” what we suggest calling “artificially induced synaesthesia” presents more differences
with canonical synaesthesia than other novel conditions sometimes labeled as emergent forms of synaesthesia.
possibility (2) that future hypnosis, or carefully-controlled drug
studies might provide evidence of consistent, idiosyncratic, auto-
matic, and crucially conscious concurrents being induced by
specific sensory (or conceptual) inducers? As we have stressed in
this piece, the evidence in support of such a claim is, at present,
remarkably thin on the ground. Regarding the most promising
example to date of acquired synaesthesia (Cohen Kadosh et al.,
2009), it remains to be seen whether this is anything more than
merely hypnotically-induced mental imagery (cf. Leuba, 1940),
though the distinction here is, admittedly difficult to draw out
(Craver-Lemley and Reeves, 2013). What would nonetheless be
the consequences if robust cases of artificially induced synaesthe-
sia were to be evidenced? One possible consequence would be to
consider that the idea of a neurological structural grounding for
synaesthesia (e.g., Banissy et al., 2012) does not hold, as individu-
als without the neurological (qua genetic) disposition to develop
synaesthesia in childhood could acquire it later in life. The evi-
dence of a polygenetic origin for synaesthesia—still weak (Brang
and Ramachandran, 2011)—could point toward a second possi-
bility, that the disposition to become a synaesthete is not equally
distributed in the population and in time.
For the moment though, the inclusion of the results of train-
ing, drugs, or hypnosis adds to the fact that the word synaesthesia
is acting as something of an umbrella term, and losing its scien-
tific robustness (see Table 2). The way to resist this dissolution
is to insist on the occurrence of a conscious concurrent being
a necessary condition for meriting the label of synaesthesia. A
form of consistency should be present, not as an a priori defini-
tional demand (which can be seen as a dogmatic threshold, see
Simner, 2012), but as a way to give weight to the occurrence of
the conscious concurrent (see Eagleman et al., 2007).
Now, if it is impossible to acquire synaesthesia in adult-
hood, how can we explain the fact that many if not all of
the inducer-concurrent mappings exhibited by so-called devel-
opmental synaesthetes must have been acquired at some stage
during development? Think only of the acquisition of colored
graphemes, or the childhood tastes (rather than, say, the tastes
associated with baby food), that can act as inducers/or concur-
rents in certain synaesthetes. Here perhaps the appropriate thing
to do is to suggest that there may simply be a critical period in
human development for the acquisition, or expression, of devel-
opmental synaesthesia (see Daw, 2003, on the notion of critical
periods for visual development)—probably only in those with
a genetic disposition to develop it (Brang and Ramachandran,
2011). There is only one documented case of discordant monozy-
gotic female twins, where one sister has conscious grapheme-
color synesthesia while the other does not (Smilek et al., 2005)
But this is not a counterexample showing that individuals could
have the genetic disposition and not develop synaesthesia: As the
authors themselves point out, the absence of development must
also have a genetic (and not environmental) basis (i.e., an epi-
genetic event, X chromosome inactivation, or a mutation of a
synaesthesia gene).
For us, perhaps the more interesting issues in this area revolve
around the question of if, and why, it may be easier to acquire
certain associations than it is to acquire others, and whether there
is any relation between the associations that appear commonly in
developmental synaesthetes and those that non-synaesthetes find
it easier to acquire (or else to strengthen). One other question that
seems particularly interesting in terms of future study relates to
individual differences in the ability of people to learn new associa-
tions (be they intramodal or crossmodal). This issue has come up
in passing in a number of the studies that have been reviewed here
(e.g., Kusnir and Thut, 2012; see also Cohen Kadosh et al., 2009).
It might well turn out to be the case that certain associations are
just easier to learn that others (cf. Baeyens et al., 1990)—such as,
for example, the association between rounded shapes or higher
pitch sounds and brighter colors vs. angular shapes and lower
pitch sounds and darker colors. This would then explain why
these higher-order are resemblances found between synaesthetes,
and between synaesthetes and non-synaesthetes (Simner et al.,
2005).
As far as the explanation of the development of synaesthesia is
concerned, we would argue the real challenge is to understand
the specificity of the learning curve of synaesthesia (including
its resistance to further training and its high degree of stability
over time once established) as well as the specific nature of the
concurrent experience.
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